Vernon Smith's Insomnia and the Dawn of Economics as Experimental Science by Theodore C. Bergstrom
Vernon Smith’s Insomnia and the Dawn of




If asked to write a short list of economists whose work will most inﬂuence
the development of economics over the next 50 years, I would put Vernon
Smith’s name close to the top. As Smith observed [53], economics has been
traditionally thought to be an “observational” science like astronomy or
meteorology, rather than an experimental science like physics or chemistry.
The great accomplishment of Smith and his coworkers has been to convince
the economics profession that economics can be an experimental science.
A wide range of previously “untestable” propositions in economics become
subject to empirical investigation once we realize that controlled laboratory
experiments are possible. This has drastic implications for the attitude that
we bring to our discipline. Smith [54] describes this change:
“::: the training of economists conditions us to think of eco-
nomics as an a priori science, and not as an observational sci-
ence in which the interplay between theory and observation is
paramount. Consequently, we come to believe that economic
problems can be understood fully by just thinking about them
::: But experimentation changes the way you think about eco-
nomics ::: economics begins to represent concepts and proposi-
tions capable of being or failing to be demonstrated. Observation
starts to loom large as the centerpiece of economics.”
¤Theodore C. Bergstrom is the Aaron and Cherie Raznick Professor of Economics,
University of California at Santa Barbara, Santa Barbara, California. Thanks to Mark
Isaac and to Gary Charness for helpful discussions.
1A large and growing community of economic researchers now conducts
laboratory experiments in economics. The Economic Science Association,
an organization of experimental economists that was founded by Smith and
a few coworkers, currently has about 200 members. In 1995, theHandbook
of Experimental Economics [26], edited by John Kagel and Alvin Roth, ap-
peared with excellent surveys of an impressive array of experimental work.
The pace of experimental work has since accelerated and a new Handbook
of Experimental Economics Results [34], edited by C. Plott and V.L. Smith,
will appear in 2003. But perhaps the most signiﬁcant measure of the im-
pact of experimental economics is the way that experimental results have
reshaped the thinking of those who work in game theory, in the theory of
consumer choice, and in the applied areas such of public economics, indus-
trial organization, resource economics, labor economics, and ﬁnance.
Experimental economists have also initiated a new branch of economics
that promises to assume great importance. This is the science of experimen-
tally tested economic design. At least since Jeremy Bentham, [2], economists
have attempted to use economic theory to guide them in proposing insti-
tutional arrangements that lead to eﬃcient social outcomes. But only in
recent years, have economists thought to use the experimental laboratory as
a “wind tunnel” in testing new economic designs.1
2 Competitive Market Experiments
2.1 Simple Supply-Demand Markets
Smith’s experimental career began with the study of experimental competi-
tive markets. The use of controlled market experiments in economics seems
to have been initiated by Edward Chamberlin, who conducted a series of
market experiments in his Harvard classroom and reported the results in
the Journal of Political Economy [6] in 1948.
Chamberlin “induced” market demand and supply in his Harvard class-
room by distributing cards that assigned each participating student to be
either a supplier or a demander. Each supplier was assigned a seller cost
at which she could supply a single unit and each demander a buyer value
for single unit of the good. In any sale, the seller’s proﬁt is the diﬀerence
1Al Roth’s game theory web page has a section called “The emerging
(consulting) business of economic design” (http://www.economics.harvard.edu/
»aroth/alroth.html#design) with many examples of the use of experiments to help
devise economic mechanisms for practical problems.
2between the price and her seller cost, while the buyer’s proﬁt is the diﬀer-
ence between his assigned buyer value and the price. Students were asked
to move about the room trying to make the best deal they could with a
person of the other type. When a buyer and seller agreed on a price, the
transaction was recorded on the blackboard for all to see. Trading continued
until no more supplier-demander pairs were willing to make trades.
The assigned distribution of seller costs and buyer values in Chamber-
lin’s experiment determine supply and demand curves showing quantities
that would be demanded and supplied at any given uniform price. If the
experimental outcome were the same as that predicted by competitive equi-
librium theory, then the crossing of supply and demand curves would deter-
mine both the equilibrium price and the equilibrium quantity and the prices
in all transactions would be the same.
Chamberlin argued that his experimental results demonstrated the inad-
equacy of competitive theory for realistic market situations, where individual
buyers and sellers don’t have enough information to determine equilibrium
prices and quantities. He found signiﬁcant variation in prices between trans-
actions. He also found that in 46 separate classroom experiments, the num-
ber of transactions exceeded the competitive prediction 39 times and was
never smaller. He also found that usually the observed mean price was lower
than the predicted competitive price. Chamberlin suggested that
“::: economists may have been led unconsciously to share
their unique knowledge of the equilibrium point with their the-
oretical creatures, the buyers and sellers who, of course, in real
life have no knowledge of it whatsoever. ([6], p 102)
Looking at Chamberlin’s article today, it is remarkable that such a fas-
cinating and provocative line of research could have been ignored by almost
everyone in the economics profession. In fact, it appears that this jewel was
almost lost. According to the Social Science Citation Index, Chamberlin’s
paper was cited by other authors only four times between its publication in
1948 and its revival in 1962 by Vernon Smith. Smith recognized the mer-
its of Chamberlin’s experimental method, but brought fresh ideas to the
problem of price formation in markets. In so doing, Smith began a series of
market experiments and developed a methodology and collection of results
that stands today as a cornerstone of a new discipline.
Smith describes the genesis of his experimental work in a delightful pas-
sage from his essay “Experimental Economics at Purdue,” which can be
found in Smith’s Papers in Experimental Economics [57]. We are treated
3to a glimpse of the nocturnal churning of a creative mind forming a revolu-
tionary idea.
“Experimental economics started at Purdue in the late fall
of 1955 ::: I had insomnia one night, and ::: I found myself
thinking about the classroom experiment that Ed Chamberlin
used to perform with the Harvard graduate students to prove the
impossibility of perfect competition. I didn’t take Chamberlin’s
course, ::: but I did observe and participate in Chamberlin’s
little ‘experiment’. The scuttlebutt among the Harvard graduate
students was that the whole exercise was sort of silly :::
So there I was, wide-awake at 3 am, thinking about Cham-
berlin’s silly experiment. He gave each buyer a card with a max-
imum buying price for a single unit, and each seller a card with
a minimum selling price for one unit. All of us were instructed
just to circulate in the room, engage a buyer (or seller), negoti-
ate a contract, or go out to ﬁnd another buyer (or seller) and so
on. If a buyer and a seller made a contract, they were to come
to Chamberlin, reveal the price of the exchange, turn in their
cards, and he would post the price on the blackboard for all to
see. When it was all over, he would reveal the implicit demand
and supply schedules, and we would learn the important lesson
that supply and demand theory was worthless in explaining what
had happened; namely that prices were not near the equilibrium
and neither was the quantity exchanged.
The thought occurred to me that the idea of doing an ex-
periment was right, but what was wrong was that if you were
going to show that competitive equilibrium was not realizable
::: you should choose an institution of exchange that might be
more favorable to yielding competitive equilibrium. Then when
such an equilibrium failed to be approached, you would have a
powerful result. This led to two ideas: (1) why not use the dou-
ble oral auction procedure, used on the stock and commodity
exchanges? (2) why not conduct the experiment in a sequence
of trading ‘days’ in which supply and demand were renewed to
yield functions that were daily ﬂows?”
Smith’s ﬁrst published discussion of the results of his classroom exper-
iments appeared in the Journal of Political Economy in 1962 [47]. The
market environment for this experiment was similar to that in Chamberlin’s
4experiments, except that it added the two features he had concocted in his
“insomniacal plan” (1) Whereas Chamberlin used an unstructured “trading
pit” design, Smith, used a double oral auction scheme in which both buyers
and sellers call out bids or oﬀers while an auctioneer recognizes and records
transactions resulting from accepted bids and oﬀers. This continues until
there are no more acceptable bids or oﬀers. (2) At the conclusion of trad-
ing, Smith reopened the market for a new “trading day”. In the new day,
everyone has the same buyer value and seller cost as in the previous day.
No goods are carried over from one day to the next. The only thing that
has changed is that market participants have now observed the outcomes of
the previous day’s trading and may adjust their expectations accordingly.
Typically, the subjects would iterate through four or ﬁve trading days.
Smith shares his thrill of astonishment as he observed the results of his
newly-designed experiment.
“The following January, I carried through my insomniacal
plan ::: I am still recovering from the shock of the experimental
results. The outcome was unbelievably consistent with competi-
tive price theory. If these results are to believed, what was being
knocked down was Chamberlin’s hypothesis of the unattainabil-
ity of supply and demand theory. But the results can’t be be-
lieved, I thought. It must be an accident, so I must take another
class and do a new experiment with diﬀerent supply and demand
schedules.”
Over the next several years, Smith performed a great many variations
of this experiment. He discovered that the convergence of double oral auc-
tion results toward competitive equilibrium is robust to variations in the
shape of demand and supply curves, to asymmetries in the distribution of
proﬁts between demanders and suppliers, and to various permutations in
research design. [49], [55], [43], [42]. He also learned that convergence to
competitive equilibrium occurs with as few as six to eight agents. As Smith
points out, these results appear to extend the applicability of supply and de-
mand theory far beyond the frictionless, price-taking environment assumed
by conventional economic theory.
Smith’s experimental methods evolved as he pursued his research pro-
gram, and his methodological innovations have profoundly inﬂuenced the
way that most experimental economics is done today. In his 1962 exper-
iments, as in Chamberlin’s earlier experiments, the “proﬁts” earned by
subjects were only hypothetical and no cash changed hands. In his next
5published experiment [48], Smith’s hypothetical proﬁts were backed by ac-
tual monetary payoﬀs. Smith appeared in a Purdue colleague’s classroom
(with no advance notice to the students) carrying experimental materials
and payoﬀ money. Successful subjects in this experiment earned the equiv-
alent of about $35 in today’s currency. In subsequent work [63], Smith
investigated the eﬀects of monetary rewards on subject performance. His
evidence shows that inexperienced subjects converge toward “rational” be-
havior more rapidly as the size of rewards are increase. Smith emphasizes
the importance of using monetary rewards to achieve “salience;” so that sub-
jects’ objectives coincide with what the investigator thinks they are. Thus
he maintains that monetary incentives should be suﬃcient that subjects
will try to maximize the payoﬀs stated by the experimenter, even where this
involves mental eﬀort or tedium.
2.2 Alternative Market Institutions
Having established striking results in the competitive double-auction envi-
ronment, Smith went on to investigate the performance of a wide variety
of alternative market institutions, operating in markets with similar funda-
mentals of buyer values and seller costs. A very readable summary of this
body of work is found in a recent paper by Smith. [65].
Through the 1960’s and most of the 1970’s, Smith’s experiments were
“low tech”, using ordinary classrooms with no special equipment other than
paper and pencil. In 1975, Smith moved from Purdue to the University
of Arizona, where he developed a computer laboratory for experiments.
Smith and Arlington Williams designed and programmed implementations
of the double auction in which subjects would interact through computer
terminals in a carefully monitored laboratory environment. In [46], Smith
and Williams explored some of the many double auction designs that be-
come possible when the computer manages the queueing of bids, oﬀers, and
transactions. Of the systems they investigate in the laboratory, the one
that works best in terms of price stability and market eﬃciency maintains
a “rank queue” in which oﬀers are accepted and placed in a queue, with the
lowest not-yet-accepted oﬀer and highest not-yet-accepted bid automatically
entered as the current standing bids and oﬀers. These features are similar
to procedures of the New York Stock Exchange which feature a “specialists
book” with bid-ask reduction rules. This suggests that evolutionary forces
in actual stock markets have led them to market designs that promote eﬃ-
ciency and stability.
In [48], Smith investigated whether outcomes were sensitive to who could
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of the market can make oﬀers, Smith found that “silence is golden” in the
sense that the contracts tended to favor the side that did not make oﬀers.
While this diﬀerence from the double auction results is statistically signif-
icant, the magnitudes of the price diﬀerence is not large and the outcomes
from one-sided markets were as eﬃcient as those with double auctions.
A series of papers, [55], [46], [44] compared the outcomes under double
oral auctions with such alternative institutions as posted prices and sealed-
bid auctions. In [45], Smith and Williams follow up on earlier experimental
work by Charles Plott and Mark Isaac [24] to study surprising eﬀects of
non-binding price controls on the dynamics of competitive markets. In [69]
and [62], Smith and his coauthors discuss experiments in which subjects
participate in two simultaneous markets where the demand in each market
depends on prices in the other. Remarkably, it turns out that after four or
ﬁve rounds of trading, prices and quantities converge quite closely to the
levels predicted by competitive theory.
An alternative to the double auction that is more familiar to most eco-
nomic theorists is Leon Walras’ tˆ atonnement mechanism [67]. The diﬀerence
between these two mechanisms is that with tˆ atonnement, no trades take
place in any period until a price is found at which demand and supply for
that period are equal, while with the double auction, actual trading takes
place continuously between agents who do not know the equilibrium price,
and thus may trade at prices that diﬀer from equilibrium.
According to Smith,
Walras’ experience with the operations of the Paris Bourse
and his need for a price mechanism that, in principle, could co-
ordinate general equilibrium price adjustments let him to invent
the tˆ atonnement mechanism.”
Even today, the performance of the Walrasian mechanism is of consid-
erable practical as well as theoretical interest. Each morning, for example,
the New York Stock Exchange determines the opening prices of securities
by a method that is essentially the tˆ atonnement mechanism.
Modern theorists have long known that in general, the Walrasian mecha-
nism can produce unstable dynamics when there are multiple markets. But
the actual performance of this mechanism in simple functioning markets
has not been well understood. The ﬁrst laboratory experiments investi-
gating the performance of the tˆ atonnement mechanism were conducted by
Patrick Joyce, [25], who found Walrasian tˆ atonnement to perform very well
7in a stationary market where each buyer and seller could trade at most one
unit.
In [61], Smith and coauthors compare the performance of the Walrasian
mechanism in a more challenging market environment than that consid-
ered by Joyce. Instead of a stationary environment, the mechanisms are
confronted with supply and demand conditions that shift between periods.
Furthermore, individuals are also allowed to engage in multiple transactions.
These two changes make it much more likely that with tˆ atonnement, traders
could beneﬁt from shading their orders in order to inﬂuence the Walrasian
price. Indeed Smith and his coauthors found in their experiments that the
tˆ atonnement mechanism consistently performed less eﬃciency than the con-
tinuous double-auction mechanism. Although the prices that emerged with
the Walrasian mechanism were close to those predicted by competitive the-
ory, buyers and sellers appeared to engage in strategic withholding of trade,
and as a result, the number of transactions fell short of eﬃciency.
The study of alternative mechanisms has led Smith to conclude that
“institutions matter” in ways that a priori economic theory would not have
predicted. This work has had the healthy eﬀect of inducing economists to
pay much greater attention to the inﬂuence of institutional structure on
economic results.
2.3 Bidding and Auctions
In recent years, the study of auctions has become an exciting showplace
for the power of economics. Not only have economists found elegant and
surprising theoretical results, but they have been able to provide eﬀective
advice to policy-makers by designing auctions suitable to a variety of insti-
tutional and technical settings. This enterprise has been greatly enriched by
the interaction of laboratory work with economic theory and policy advising.
“The Biggest Auction Ever: The Sale of the British 3G Telecom Li-
censes”, [5] by Ken Binmore and Paul Klemperer is an engaging account of
the part played by economists in organizing the British government’s sale
of spectrum licenses for the the third-generation mobile-phone technology.
This auction in March and April, 2000, raised about $34 billion, or about
2.5% of British GNP. According to the authors, “not since the Praetorian
Guard knocked down the entire Roman Empire to Didius Julianus in AD 195
had there been an auction quite as large.” To design the auction mechanism
used for marketing licences, the authors made extensive use of laboratory
tests with subjects playing for controlled stakes. These experiments helped
to expose potential ﬂaws in their original designs. In addition, the authors
8found that letting government oﬃcials play roles in the laboratory simula-
tions was highly eﬀective in helping the oﬃcials to understand the nature of
the problem.
These experiences would come as no surprise to Vernon Smith, who in
1991 explained the aﬃnity between auction theory and the laboratory:
::: Much of game theory, as with general equilibrium theory,
is stillborn, unable to guide meaningful empirical investigation
because of its failure to come to grips with exchange institutions
and thus with process. But the modelling of auctions is directly
predicated upon the allocation and message rules of alternative
market institutions. ::: In environments in which alternative
auction institutions are equivalent, this institution-free property
is derived as a theorem instead of an implicit assumption. Auc-
tion theory does more than begin with the extensive form of
a game, it begins with various extensive forms we observe in
the economy ::: Consequently it is able to guide empirical test-
ing programs ::: Where theory fails under experiment, which
inevitably it will do with suﬃciently rigorous “boundary” exper-
iments, it is easier to see which part of the theory has failed and
to see where the theory needs improvement. [59] p 509”
Smith and his coworkers have run a large variety of experiments that test
the theoretical propositions of auction theory [8], [10], [13], [12], [11]. Among
the regularities that they discovered are the following: (i) English auctions
and second-bidder sealed-bid auctions, which are theoretically isomorphic
in private values environments, produce very similar results in the experi-
mental laboratory. (ii) Dutch auctions and ﬁrst-bidder sealed-bid auctions,
which are also theoretically isomorphic in private goods environments do not
produce the same results in the laboratory. (iii) In laboratory experiments,
Nash equilibrium models that assume identical attitudes toward risk by all
participants are rejected. (iv) In laboratory experiments, as predicted by
auction theory, English and second-bidder auctions result in more eﬃcient
outcomes than Dutch and ﬁrst-bidder sealed bid auctions, while ﬁrst-bidder
sealed-bid auctions tended to be more eﬃcient than Dutch auctions.
Klemperer [27] emphasizes the importance of designing tailor-made auc-
tions to solve the unique institutional problems that arise in particular cir-
cumstances. He points out several examples where unsuitable “oﬀ-the-shelf”
have led to auction “ﬁascos” and ineﬃcient outcomes. Smith’s earlier pa-
pers include some fascinating eﬀorts to use the laboratory to test auction
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Method for Airport Time Slot Allocation,” [37] Smith, Rassetti, and Bulﬁn
test a mechanism that allows airlines to submit various contingent bids for
ﬂight-compatible combinations of airport landing or takeoﬀ slots. In “De-
signing Smart Computer-Assisted Markets: An Experimental Auction for
Gas Networks”, Smith, Kevin McCabe, and Rassetti [32] study an auction
market for dealing with the complexities of simultaneously pricing natural
gas at each delivery outlet, source, and on all pipelines that connect sources
with delivery points.
2.4 Intertemporal Asset Markets
Working with several collaborators, Smith has used experimental markets
to study intertemporal asset markets. A remarkable early paper in this vein
[33] describes an elegant experiment with a “two-season market.” In each
round of this experiment, a good is demanded and supplied in each of two
periods. In the “autarkic” outcome, with no storage, the equilibrium price
would be higher in the second period than in the ﬁrst. However, if the good
can be stored at zero cost, it would be worthwhile for some individuals to
purchase and store the good either for their own use or for resale. Indeed in
this environment, the competitive equilibrium should have the same price in
both periods. Experimental subjects are given no direct information about
aggregate demand or supply in either period, but they participate in ﬁve
rounds of this two-season market, all with the same fundamentals. In the
initial round of play, prices are quite close to the autarkic outcome, with a
higher price in the second round than in the ﬁrst, but by the ﬁnal round,
prices are essentially the same in both rounds and both prices and quantities
are very close to the levels predicted by competitive theory. The authors
emphasize that this convergence to competitive outcomes even with rela-
tively small numbers of traders and even though no individual has “perfect
knowledge” of market conditions.
Smith and his collaborators have produced a remarkable body of work
on laboratory-induced stock market bubbles [41], [36], [28]. In these ex-
periments, there is typically a series of spot markets for “stocks” that pay
random dividends drawn from a known probability distribution for each of
a ﬁxed number of periods. Under a wide variety of conditions, they ﬁnd a
robust pattern of outcomes. With inexperienced traders, trading over the
lifetime of the stock exhibits dramatic price bubbles, in which stock prices
rise far above the fundamental values based on their dividends and then
crash back to their fundamental values at some time late in the stock’s life-
10time. As subjects become more experienced with trading in this kind of
market, the bubbles tend to disappear and spot prices approach those that
would be predicted by rational expectations models. In a recent summary
of this work, David Porter and Smith [35] conclude that:
“Financial theorists, and economic theorists in the rational
expectations mode will tell you ::: that these bubbles should
not happen; that ‘something’ is wrong with the experiments,
although all speciﬁc ‘somethings’ such as use of student subjects,
lack of short selling and margin buying ::: have all been tested,
and the predictions were not born out. ::: Psychologists ::: love
the bubbles because they see bubbles as violating the rationality
of expectations.
Both the theorists and the psychologists, however, are wrong
in thinking that rational expectations are falsiﬁed by the ex-
periments. ::: A rational expectations equilibrium, if attained,
cannot be instantaneous; there must be a process whereby peo-
ple go from wherever they start to the ending equilibrium. ::: As
we view it, the experiments provide the theory with a dynamic
learning directive. Rational expectations theory does not deﬁne
a process whereby agents come to have rational expectations.”
3 Public Goods Experiments
The search for institutions that would provide eﬃcient provision of public
goods along with equitable methods of paying for them has a long and in-
teresting history. Knut Wicksell argued in 1896 [68] that a just and eﬃcient
system of public ﬁnance should require that any incremental change in pub-
lic expenditures be voted on simultaneously with a proposed set of taxes
to cover its cost, and that such changes should be accepted only if there
is nearly unanimous consent among taxpayers. Erik Lindahl in 1919 [31]
proposed a related scheme in which tax rates and the supply of public goods
are determined in such a way that given the assigned tax rates, all voters
agree on the same quantity of public goods. Although these proposals have
intrigued economic theorists, they apparently have not been implemented
by real governments.
Modern economists understand that Wicksell’s and Lindahl’s proposals
are incomplete, in the sense that they do not specify the way in which the
necessary information for their implementation would be obtained from self-
interested citizens, who are likely to reveal their true preferences only if it is
11in their interest to do so. Paul Samuelson [39] expressed strong skepticism
that any decentralized market or voting scheme could ﬁnd or attain Pareto-
eﬃcient provision of public goods. Leonid Hurwicz [23] established that it
is in general not possible to ﬁnd an “incentive-compatible and individually
rational” mechanism that implements Pareto optimal allocations of private
goods and John Ledyard and J. D. Roberts [30] showed that this result
extends to public goods.
A few economic theorists, however, took up the challenge of ﬁnding
“satisfactory” if not ideal mechanisms for allocating public goods. Edward
Clarke [14] and Theodore Groves [18] independently devised a scheme that
is now known as the Groves-Clarke mechanism. The Groves-Clarke mecha-
nism is an extension of William Vickrey’s [66] incentive compatible auction
mechanism. Groves and John Ledyard [17] devised another scheme, now
known as the Groves-Ledyard mechanism. These mechanisms are similar
in spirit to the Wicksell and Lindahl proposals, but have explicit incentive-
compatible rules for information transmission. A drawback of the Groves-
Clarke mechanism is that it applies only if willingness to pay for public
goods does not depend on income (the case of quasi-linear utility). More-
over, the Groves-Clarke mechanism does not quite yield a Pareto eﬃcient
outcome. The Groves-Ledyard mechanism applies under fairly arbitrary
preferences, but unlike the Groves-Clarke mechanism, it does not have a
dominant strategy equilibrium. On the other hand, Nash equilibria of the
game generated by the Groves-Ledyard mechanism are fully Pareto eﬃ-
cient. However, as Bergstrom, Simon, and Titus point out, [4], although
Nash equilibrium for the Groves-Ledyard mechanism is unique in the case
of quasi-linear preferences, if demand for public goods increases with in-
come then there are generally many distinct Nash equilibria and these diﬀer
signiﬁcantly in the distribution of beneﬁts among participants. When the
Groves-Ledyard mechanism generates multiple Nash equilibria that are not
Pareto ranked, it remains an open question whether there is a way to coor-
dinate the players on a single Nash equilibrium.
Perhaps more disconcerting than their theoretical drawbacks is the fact
that these new mechanisms seem to be rarely if ever observed in the real
world. Can it be that these mechanisms have not been adopted because
nobody had thought of them until recently and that it takes time for new
ideas to be adopted? Or is it that they have serious ﬂaws that have prevented
their adaptation and spread?
Vernon Smith was among the ﬁrst to understand that this situation
cries out for laboratory experiments. He set to work in designing a series
of experiments, testing alternative mechanisms for determining the amount
12of public goods and the way in which they are paid for. Admirable surveys
of the large and growing literature on experimental tests of public goods
mechanisms have been written by John Ledyard [29] and more recently by
Yan Chen [7]. In [50] and [56], Smith proposed a mechanism, which he
calls The Auction Method, and which he says “can be interpreted as an
implementation of Wicksell’s principle of unanimity.” In [51], Smith points
out that his mechanism is fairly close to existing practice in some fund-
raising drives, where pledges will be collected from donors only if some target
amount of funds is collected. In Smith’s Auction Method, each participant
proposes a quantity of the public good to be supplied and also a share of
the total cost of the public good that he would pay. Proposed quantities
and shares are collected by an auctioneer, who then proposes a quantity of
public goods that is the mean of the quantities named by participants. The
auctioneer also proposes that each participant pay the share of total cost
that is not covered by the bids of other participants. If the auctioneer’s
proposal receives unanimous agreement, it will be implemented. It is easy
to see that if the auctioneer’s proposal is accepted, the agreed-on cost shares
must add to at at least one. If they add to more than one, excess revenue
is rebated according to a speciﬁed rule. Each participant then gets the
implied payoﬀ and the experiment ends. If anyone rejects the auctioneer’s
proposal, it is scrapped and the participants try again, with new proposed
shares and quantities. The cycle is continued until either there is unanimous
agreement to some proposal or until 6 rounds of play are completed and
no agreement is reached. In this environment, the reason that individuals
agree to pay signiﬁcant amounts of taxes and request reasonable quantities
of public goods is that they don’t want the other players to veto the outcome
proposed by the auctioneer. One of the Nash equilibria for the game deﬁned
by this experimental is the Lindahl equilibrium, which is Pareto optimal,
but because of the ﬁnite horizon for bargaining, the mechanism has many
other Nash equilibria, not all of which are not eﬃcient.
A series of Vernon Smith’s papers [50], [56], [58], [51] report on exper-
iments with his Auction Method for public goods provision. Smith ﬁnds
that with quasi-linear utility and with groups of 5-8 participants, quantities
of public goods selected are fairly close to eﬃcient, but the distribution of
costs is not very close to Lindahl equilibrium. In about 10 percent of the
sessions of the auction method, the participants fail to reach unanimous
agreement, in which case no public goods are provided. In [51], Smith tried
the Auction Method for Cobb-Douglas rather than quasi-linear preferences.
The experimental outcomes diﬀered signiﬁcantly from Lindahl predictions
and did not perform well as measured by Pareto eﬃciency.
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for public goods experiments, including an implementation of the incentive-
compatible Groves-Ledyard scheme and a non-incentive compatible imple-
mentation of Lindahl equilibrium. For groups of four, ﬁve, and eight mem-
bers, his Groves-Ledyard mechanism usually resulted in near-optimal pro-
vision, while his implementation of the Lindahl mechanism usually resulted
in outcomes that were quite far from eﬃciency. In later work, Harstad and
Marrese [19], found that mechanisms similar to Smith’s implementation of
the Groves-Ledyard mechanism frequently failed to converge to eﬃcient out-
comes.
In a study funded by the National Aeronautics and Space Administra-
tion, Jeﬀrey Banks, Charles Plott, and David Porter [1] conducted a series
of laboratory tests of the Smith auction mechanism, which was being con-
sidered as a possible device for allocating resources in the development and
operation of a space station for the mid 1990’s. Their experiment was con-
ducted with groups of 10 subjects. When agreement was reached with the
Smith Auction Method, the outcomes were close to eﬃcient, but unfortu-
nately, agreement was reached in only 14 of 28 trials. Since the amount
of public good supplied is zero when agreement is not reached, this sug-
gests that Smith’s mechanism is not very eﬃcient. For comparison, Banks,
Plott and Porter also ran laboratory experiments in which public goods were
funded by simple direct contributions. With this treatment, contributions
fell far short of eﬃciency and far below the average contributions realized by
Smith’s method. Thus, on average, the Smith auction method outperforms
a simple direct contribution method, but falls far short of full eﬃciency.
In [59] Smith suggests that, given our current knowledge, economists
need to take a somewhat cautious and humble approach to the problem of
wholesale economic design.
“Like languages, economic institutions ::: are not the prod-
uct of one mind or someone’s logical experimental design, but
are the product of thousands of minds over many generations
of trial-and-error ﬁltering, combined with a societal memory for
those arrangements that are in some sense best, or good enough
::: Can we consciously design new and better property-right ex-
change systems? There is good reason to be skeptical about
whether any of us professionals knows or understands enough
about the elements of institutional success to allow an aﬃrma-
tive answer to this question. But it is also true that we have
made signiﬁcant progress in the last quarter of a century in our
14abstract and empirical understanding of incentives in institu-
tions.
Although some interesting experimental work has been done with mech-
anisms for public goods provision, far less has been done and results are
much less conclusive than with private goods markets. As Chen [7] main-
tains, this seems to be an area where much interesting research is yet to be
done.
4 Bargaining, Psychology, and Evolution
4.1 Rationality and Context
Most of economic theory is motivated by the study of highly rational agents,
able to solve problems of arbitrary complexity. Experimental psychologists
and behavioral economists maintain that real people are not nearly so ra-
tional. They have accumulated a large stock of experiments in which people
make decisions that are inconsistent with rational decision theory. Vernon
Smith [64] proposes that neither group has the story quite right and that
experimental economics oﬀers “a third view, which documents a growing
body of evidence that is consistent with rational models, although there are
many exceptions.” He argues that much of the tension between the views of
the rationalist economists and those of the psychologists’ can be attributed
to a fundamental misconception shared by both camps. According to Smith:
“the numerous areas of claimed disagreement (stem from) two
unstated premises on which there is implicit agreement between
psychology and mainstream theory: (1) rationality in the econ-
omy emanates from and derives from the rationality of individual
decision-makers in the economy, and (2) individual rationality is
a cognitively intensive, calculating process of maximization in
the self-interest. A third shared tenant, which is a correlate of
points 1 and 2 is that (3) an acceptable and fundamental way
to test economic theory is to test directly the economic rational-
ity of individuals isolated from actual experience in social and
economic institutions. [64]
Smith believes that evidence from experimental economics suggests that
economists and psychologists need to abandon or at least revise implicit
premisses (1) and (2) quoted above, along with the methodological impli-
cation (3) that economic theory can be satisfactorily tested by examining
15subjects’ choices in abstract situations devoid of institutional context. In
Smith’s view, “institutions serve as social tools that reinforce, even induce
economic rationality.”
Smith’s most compelling exhibit in support of this view is the success of
laboratory market experiments. In [64], Smith argues that:
“What has emerged from 30 years of experimental research is
that preceding premisses 1-3 are false. ::: What these and many
hundreds of other experiments have shown is that (1) prices and
allocations converge quickly to the neighborhood of the predicted
rational expectations competitive equilibrium, and (2) these re-
sults generalize to a wide variety of posted-price, sealed-bid, and
other institutions of exchange, although convergence rates tend
to vary and can be inﬂuenced by extreme parameter distribu-
tions.”
Smith points out that convergence to the outcomes predicted by rational
behavior occurs despite the fact that subjects have little understanding of
the economic processes at work, and in post-experiment interviews often
describe the market situation as confused and disorderly.
Smith [64] also suggests that many of the behavioral anomalies noted by
economists and psychologists in laboratory experiments will either disappear
or be much less pronounced when framed in the context of a market. He
cites evidence that this is the case for “preference reversals,” diﬀerences
between “willingness-to-pay,” and “willingness to accept,” confusion about
opportunity cost and sunk costs, and unwillingness to accept a small share
in ultimatum games.
4.2 A Propensity to Barter and Truck?
Smith conjectures that the human ability to operate successfully in mar-
ket environments may be an evolved capacity, similar to the capability for
learning languages. Evolutionary psychologists (see for example Leda Cos-
mides and John Tooby [9]) propose that evolution has endowed humans
with mental modules for solving social problems. These modules are as
much a part of the adapted mind as our ability to hear and see. Among
these modules might be an aptitude for rational trading and for maintaining
cooperative reciprocal relations. Vernon was not the ﬁrst Smith to propose
such a propensity. In 1776, Adam Smith stated a strikingly similar view.
16“This division of labour, from which so many advantages are
derived, is not originally the eﬀect of any human wisdom, which
foresees and intends that general opulence to which it gives oc-
casion. It is the necessary, though very slow and gradual con-
sequence of a certain propensity in human nature which has in
view no such extensive utility; the propensity to truck, barter,
and exchange one thing for another. Whether this propensity
be one of those original principles in human nature of which no
further account can be given; or whether, as seems more prob-
able, it be the necessary consequence of the faculties of reason
and speech, it belongs not to our present subject to inquire. It
is common to all men, and to be found in no other race of ani-
mals, which seem to know neither this nor any other species of
contracts. :::
Whoever oﬀers to another a bargain of any kind, proposes
to do this. Give me that which I want, and you shall have this
which you want:::” [40], Wealth of Nations, Book I Chapter II
4.3 Structure-Induced Rationality and Zero-Intelligence Traders
A competing view to the notion that humans have evolved to act rationally
in market contexts, is the idea that the structure of markets themselves may
produce rational outcomes, regardless of the rationality of the participants.
In a paper titled “Allocative Eﬃciency of Markets with Zero-Intelligence
Traders: Market as a Partial Substitute for Rationality” [16], D.K. Gode
and Shyam Sunder suggest that the structure of a competitive market may
enforce “rational” outcomes, regardless of the rationality of decision-makers.
Gode and Sunder conducted a simulated double auction with robotic
players. These players were assigned buyer values and seller costs exactly
as in the experiments of Chamberlin and Smith. Demanders and suppliers
made bids and oﬀers randomly drawn from a uniform distribution. However,
the program prohibited market participants from making bids and oﬀers
that would cause them to lose money. Whenever a supplier encountered a
bid that exceeded her randomly generated oﬀer a transaction would occur,
either at the oﬀer price or the bid price. Gode and Sunder discovered that a
market made up of “zero-intelligence” traders achieved outcomes that were
almost as eﬃcient as the outcomes achieved by human subjects. They also
found that took place near the end of any “trading day” usually were at
prices close to the competitive equilibrium prices.
Gode and Sunder argue that:
17“Allocative eﬃciency of a double auction derives largely from
its structure, independent of traders’ motivation, intelligence, or
learning. Adam Smith’s invisible hand ::: can generate aggre-
gate rationality not only from individual rationality but from
individual irrationality.”
As Gode and Sunder demonstrate, their robotic market performs eﬃ-
ciently only if buyers and sellers are prohibited from losing money on any
trade. The reason that the zero-intelligence traders achieve nearly full eﬃ-
ciency is that given the no-loss constraint, the only way that ineﬃciency can
arise is if a mutually proﬁtable, but socially ineﬃcient deal is struck between
two traders. This can happen if, for example, a supplier with costs higher
than the competitive equilibrium price happens to meet a demander with a
buyer value higher than his costs and if the random numbers chosen by the
two agents happen to permit a mutually proﬁtable transaction. With the
demand and supply curves imposed by Gode and Sunder, these ineﬃcient
transactions turn out to be quite improbable and hence there are typically
very few such transactions.
The fact that a market with zero-intelligence traders, constrained only
by the need to make non-negative proﬁts, performs quite eﬃciently in sim-
ple Chamberlin-Smith markets should not be taken as compelling evidence
that market structure in general eliminates the need for learning and ra-
tionality. For example, in the slightly more complex intertemporal models
that Smith studied, there are more possible ways for ineﬃcient outcomes
to arise although traders make a proﬁt on every trade. In these environ-
ments, markets made up of zero-intelligence traders would not perform very
eﬃciently, yet the experimental evidence shows that after a few rounds of
trading, human subjects reach eﬃcient outcomes close to those predicted by
competitive theory.
Even in the simple environments where zero-intelligence traders achieve
nearly eﬃcient outcomes, the time path of prices diﬀers signiﬁcantly from
that observed among human traders and there is greater variation in prices
than is seen with human traders. Moreover, in experiments with human
traders, the variance in transaction prices diminishes drastically in later
trading days. In contrast, since the robots never learn anything, the variance
of transaction prices is as large on later days of trading as on the ﬁrst day.
4.4 Ultimatum and Dictator Games
In ultimatum game experiments, subjects are matched anonymously. One
agent, the ﬁrst mover, is asked to propose a division of a ﬁxed sum of
18money between himself and the other agent. The other, the second mover,
can either accept or reject the proposed division. If the proposal is accepted,
then each agent gets the agreed amount. If the proposal is rejected, both
get zero. A simple implication of rational, selﬁsh behavior in this one-shot
game is that the second mover would accept any small amount of money
rather than zero and hence the ﬁrst mover would oﬀer a tiny amount to the
second player and keep the rest for himself.
The ultimatum game experiment has been run hundreds of times and in
dozens of countries and societies [38], [20]. In almost all of these experiments,
the ﬁrst mover’s proposals tend to be more generous than they would be
if both players were rational self-interested agents. Moreover, if the ﬁrst
mover makes an ungenerous oﬀer, the second mover is likely to reject it.
These results constitute a serious challenge to rational-choice game the-
ory. If people do not behave as rational, self-interested agents in a labora-
tory environment as simple as the ultimatum game, how can we expect game
theory to guide our thinking about real-world economic interactions? Some
have suggested that the results of ultimatum game experiments indicate that
consumers have a degree of altruism or perhaps a “taste for fairness ” that
traditional economists have failed to recognize.
Vernon Smith [60] suggests that the problem is one of context. The
abstract, one-shot game that experimenters are asked to play in one-shot
ultimatum games is alien to their ordinary economic experience. In Smith’s
words,
“Subjects come to the lab in a social context, a world of re-
peat interaction in which single transactions are not isolated but
part of an ongoing sequence.::: what is needed ::: is to reevaluate
the experimenter/theorist’s premise that subjects will view such
an experiment as a single-trial game ::: What may be wrong is
the very idea that instances of human decision interaction can
be construed as without a history or a future. (pp 80-82)
In the ultimatum game experiments, it appears that instead of dispas-
sionately maximizing the money payoﬀs oﬀered by the experimenter, many
subjects apply decision rules borrowed from similar, but more familiar con-
texts that involve repeated social interaction. In the ultimatum game, a
second mover who is oﬀered a very small share of the money to be divided
may is likely to feel a visceral urge to punish the ﬁrst mover’s greed. Where
the second mover is oﬀered only a small share, it costs very little to punish
the ﬁrst mover by refusing the oﬀer and sending both players’ payoﬀs to
19zero. In common real-world interactions, those who acquire a reputation for
willingness to punish exploiters (especially when punishment is cheap) are
likely to prosper relative to those who are found to be pushovers.
Smith and other experimental economists have explored this question by
varying the context and details of the experiment in several ingenious ways.
In [21] and [22], Smith and his coauthors investigate whether the results
of the ultimatum game are robust to increases in the amount of money at
stake and to variations in the way that the game is framed. They found that
whether the amount of money to be divided was $100 or $10, about half of
the ﬁrst movers oﬀered and equal split and only rarely did ﬁrst movers oﬀer
less than 30 per cent of the sum to the second mover. In another treatment,
Smith et al used scores on a current events quiz to determine who would be
ﬁrst and second movers. They also framed the ultimatum game as a payoﬀ
equivalent market situation, where the ﬁrst mover makes an all-or-nothing
oﬀer to sell an object to the buyer. With this treatment, the ﬁrst movers
were signiﬁcantly less generous, though most oﬀers were higher than the
game-theoretic predictions for selﬁsh, rational players.
If the generosity of ﬁrst movers and the rancorous behavior of ill-treated
second movers in ultimatum games stems from altruism or from a taste
for equal division of winnings, then we might expect the eﬀects of these
tastes to extend to markets with more than one trader on each side of the
market. But the evidence from a large body of experiments suggests that
does not happen. In [43], Smith and Williams report that in double-auction
market experiments, prices closely approached competitive equilibrium after
three rounds of trading despite strong asymmetries in the division of prof-
its between buyers and sellers. In [42], they take asymmetry to the limit
by considering markets with four suppliers and four demanders where the
competitive price either gives all proﬁts to buyers and none to sellers or vice
versa. In the initial round of trading, most transactions divide proﬁts ap-
proximately equally between buyers and sellers, but by the end of the third
round of trading, most prices are close to the competitive equilibrium price
with very unequal division of proﬁts and in all subsequent rounds, prices
remain close to competitive levels. Another striking illustration of subjects’
willingness to accept unequal division in a market environment comes from
one of the experiments in Ted Bergstrom and John Miller’s introductory
textbook, Experiments with Economic Principles ([3], Experiment 2). In
this experiment, sellers have zero marginal cost and a $10 ﬁxed cost. Some
buyers value the good at $25, some at $20 and some at $5, but the demand
curve crosses the supply curve at an equilibrium price of zero. The market is
conducted in the same way as Chamberlin’s [6] early experiments. Students
20move around the classroom seeking the best deal they can and if they reach
agreement, they report the price to the instructor who writes it on the black-
board. Trading takes place until no more buyer-seller pairs choose to make
deals. In these classroom experiments, nothing seems to deter demanders
from “taking advantage of” the sellers. Typically after three or four rounds
of trading, almost all sales are at prices of $1 or less. Buyers are making
large proﬁts and the poor sellers are all losing money.
In a one-shot ultimatum game, there is no question that a second mover
will maximize his payoﬀ by accepting any positive share. Therefore if he is
rational, selﬁsh, and truly believes that the game is a one-shot game, he will
not refuse a contract that gives him a positive payoﬀ, however small. On
the other hand, the best strategy for the ﬁrst mover depends on his beliefs
about how the second mover will respond. Robert Forsythe et al [15] devised
a simpler game intended to help untangle the motives of ﬁrst movers. In
this game, which is called the “dictator game”, the ﬁrst mover proposes a
division of a ﬁxed sum of money between himself and an anonymous second
mover who has no choice but to accept the division. In the dictator game,
rational ﬁrst movers will not be motivated by concern that a low oﬀer will
be rejected. Thus positive oﬀers in the dictator game might be seen as direct
evidence of altruism or of concern for fairness. Forsythe et al ﬁnd that ﬁrst
movers are on average much less generous in the dictator game than in the
ultimatum game, but a substantial proportion of the “dictators” continue
to oﬀer 30-50 percent to the other player.
In [22], Smith and his coauthors replicate the results of Forsythe et al.
They also try a treatment in which the dictator game framed as a market
exchange. With this treatment, about 40 percent of the dictators oﬀer zero
about 60 percent oﬀer 10 percent or less. In addition they run the dictator
game with a double blind treatment, in which the experimenters use a device
designed to convince the dictators that not only are they anonymous to the
recipients, but also to the experimenters. Remarkably, with this treatment,
the generosity of dictators almost disappears. Now more than 60 percent of
the subjects oﬀer zero and about 80 percent oﬀer 10 percent or less.
The dictator game experiments with and without double-blind treatment
suggest likely sources of the generous play in experimental environments. In
the ultimatum game, equal division is the most common oﬀer of ﬁrst movers.
In the dictator game without the double-blind treatment, most oﬀers are
less generous, but still only 20 percent oﬀer zero and the modal oﬀer is 30
percent. One might take this as evidence of altruism or a taste for equal
division. But the results of the double-blind experiment suggest otherwise.
The selﬁsh play under double-blind conditions suggests that many of the
21subjects in the dictator experiments were not convinced that they were
playing a one shot game, but instead were motivated, as Smith suggests,
by “a social concern for what others may think and for being held in high
regard by others.”
5 Conclusion
A recurring theme in Smith’s research is that competitive theory works well
to predict outcomes in laboratory markets over a much broader class of
environments than those usually assumed by economic theorists. Neither
complete information nor a large number of traders is required. While this
news is a comfort for those who are fond of familiar tools, it is also a challenge
to theorists and applied economists to produce better theories and more
sharply observant empirical work.
It seems appropriate to let Vernon Smith have the last word.
“At the heart of economics is a scientiﬁc mystery: How is it
that the pricing system accomplishes the world’s work without
anyone being in charge ::: Smash it in the command economy
and it rises as a Phoenix with a thousand heads, as the command
system becomes shot through with bribery, favors, barter and
underground exchange. ::: No law and no police force can stop
it, for the police become as large a part of the problem as of
the solution.::: The pricing system ::: is a scientiﬁc mystery as
deep as that of the expanding universe or the forces that bind
matter. For to understand it is to understand something about
how the human species got form hunter-gathering through the
agricultural and industrial revolutions to a state of aﬄuence.”
[52]
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